The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The United States, Trade Sanctions, and International Blocking Acts by Jennison, Meaghan
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 69 
Issue 1 Winter 2020 Article 10 
5-22-2020 
The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The 
United States, Trade Sanctions, and International Blocking Acts 
Meaghan Jennison 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the European Law Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, 
and the National Security Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Meaghan Jennison, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The United States, Trade 
Sanctions, and International Blocking Acts, 69 Cath. U. L. Rev. 163 (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol69/iss1/10 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The United States, Trade 
Sanctions, and International Blocking Acts 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D, The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law, expected 2020; MPP, Harvard University, 
The John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2011; B.A., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
2009. The author would like to thank Mr. Christian C. Davis and Ms. Chiara Klaui of Akin Gump Strauss 
Hauer & Feld for their guidance and expertise in reviewing this publication, her mother Beverly P. Jennison 
for her unwavering and constant support throughout the writing process, and the Catholic University Law 
Review for its assistance in the publication process. 
This comments is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol69/iss1/10 
 
 163 
THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY STAY THE SAME: 
THE UNITED STATES, TRADE SANCTIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL 
BLOCKING ACTS 
MEAGHAN JENNISON† 
In May of 2018, President Donald J. Trump announced the United States 
would unilaterally withdraw from the heavily-negotiated and widely-touted 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA,” colloquially known as the Iran 
Nuclear Deal). 1   Instead, according to the President, the United States, a 
signatory of the agreement with Iran as well as one of its major negotiators, 
proclaimed that it would re-impose international trade sanctions in an attempt to 
prevent Iran from engaging in any international trade that could potentially 
enrich the Iranian economy.  Of course, concomitant with that U.S. change, 
should Iran also choose to pull out of the agreement as a result of the Trump 
administration’s stance, the nuclear protections negotiated as part of the JCPOA 
that restrict Iranian nuclear development in exchange for favorable trade by Iran 
with other nations could disappear as well.2 
Within one day of President Trump’s withdrawal announcement, the 
European Union (EU) expressed its frustration with the U.S. announcement and 
updated its own protective trade legislation, underscoring its historical 
abhorrence of U.S. extraterritorial interference with international trade.  In 
response to the Trump administration announcement, the European Commission 
announced the renewal of the EU Blocking Statute, the previously enacted and 
utilized EU trade vehicle.  In essence, the Blocking Statute prevents European 
countries from abiding by any extraterritorial sanctions imposed by the United 
States. as a result of its withdrawal from the JCPOA. 
President Trump’s announcement regarding the JCPOA, although disruptive, 
is not the first American attempt to utilize trade to achieve foreign policy 
objectives.  In fact, the United States has a long history of attempting to impose 
international trade embargo actions with extraterritorial effects.  During the era 
of World War I, the United States sought to impose trading restrictions upon 
countries in Europe and elsewhere in the world through the Trading with the 
                                                        
† J.D, The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law, expected 2020; MPP, Harvard 
University, The John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2011; B.A., The University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2009. The author would like to thank Mr. Christian C. Davis and Ms. 
Chiara Klaui of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld for their guidance and expertise in reviewing 
this publication, her mother Beverly P. Jennison for her unwavering and constant support 
throughout the writing process, and the Catholic University Law Review for its assistance  in the 
publication process. 
 1. Exec. Order No. 13846, 83 Fed. Reg. 38939 (2018). 
 2. This did not seem to be a central concern of the Trump administration in making its 
announcement regarding withdrawal from the JCPOA. 
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Enemy Act.  For decades after the enactment of that statute, the United States, 
under the guise of protecting its own and other countries’ national security, has 
imposed a series of trading restrictions through various legislative initiatives.  
Over time, European countries simply ignored some of these U.S. legislative 
efforts or at least did not actively oppose them.  However, when the United 
States exerted its international punch with respect to Cuban trade restrictions 
from the late 1950s on, and tried to impose sanctions upon European-based 
companies, the nations of Europe began their revolt in various ways that ebbed 
and flowed during the subsequent years of the twentieth century. 
During the 1990s, this revolt came to a head when the United States pushed 
for international trade restrictions against Cuba and the EU forcefully bucked 
this U.S. attempt at domination of world trading markets.  In response, in 1996, 
the EU crafted a resolution creating a so-called “blocking statute” to neutralize 
or seriously hinder the effect of such U.S. extraterritorial measures.  This is the 
same legislative scheme recently re-authorized as a reaction to the U.S. 
announcement of its non-continuation as a party to the JCPOA. 
The EU blocking statute, as it pertains to the U.S. withdrawal from the 
JCPOA, essentially requires European companies covered by the statute ignore 
the mandates of the U.S. sanctions scheme and continue any existing business 
relationships with Iran.  This re-authorization increases legal uncertainty and 
risk for EU companies, as well as for those U.S. companies doing business in 
the EU.  Multinational corporations must decide — will the U.S. sanctions 
control their actions, or will the EU mandates carry the day? 
In light of these recent developments, this Comment will discuss the tensions 
engendered by the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, and the resultant U.S. 
movement towards international trade manipulation and domination versus the 
EU’s self-preservation efforts to maintain its own trade goals.  This Comment 
will examine the development of U.S. extraterritorial trade measures from the 
end of World War I until the present day, and international reaction to those 
perceived encroachments by the United States on international trade.  Then, this 
Comment will review several possible directions that could emerge as a result 
of the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran following the U.S. exit from the 
JCPOA, the effects of those sanctions on international trade, and the resultant 
European efforts to thwart U.S. actions. 
Part I describes the history of U.S. extraterritorial trade efforts as well as 
present-day developments, including international efforts to control and contain 
U.S. extraterritorial trade reach.  Part II discusses European efforts to enforce a 
contemporary legislative scheme in order to protect European trading interests, 
as well as currently available international dispute resolution mechanisms and 
possible international paths away from a U.S.-EU showdown.  Part III suggests 
a forceful methodology of enforcement of the EU’s own regulations to bypass 
the current European conundrum.  Finally, this Comment suggests that despite 
the strict U.S. sanctions scheme triggered by the JCPOA pullout, the United 
States, over time, likely will temper its efforts towards extraterritorial 
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international sanctions when one or more members of the EU forcefully extend 
their own statutory efforts to enforce the newly reinvigorated EU blocking 
statute. 
I. HISTORY OF U.S. EXTRATERRITORIAL TRADE MEASURES AND PRESENT-DAY 
DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Prior Historical Efforts of the United States with Respect to Extraterritorial 
Measures in Trade 
In 1917, against the backdrop of the Great War—World War I—the United 
States of America vigorously asserted its role as a global power by entering the 
modern world of international trade restriction.  The U.S. Congress passed—and 
President Woodrow Wilson signed into law—the Trading With the Enemy Act 
of 1917 (TWEA).3  A statement by President Wilson about the statute, clearly 
intended to affect negatively German commerce, noted that the law specifically 
targeted “companies incorporated under the laws of the German Empire, no 
matter where located.”4  This law—part economics and part foreign policy—set 
the stage for future endeavors by the United States to influence, control, and 
restrict trade in the international market in accordance with the U.S. worldview. 
While TWEA persisted through both World Wars and beyond, the next major 
attempt by the United States to restrict international trade did not emerge until 
about 1959, when the United States increasingly became concerned with the rise 
of communism in Fidel Castro’s Cuba, as well as with the reported presence of 
Russian missiles within Cuba located only ninety miles from the coast of 
Florida.5  President Eisenhower determined that the best course of overt action 
to address these concerns was to enact a partial blockade against Cuba.6  In 1960, 
                                                        
 3. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-44 (2012)).  The original Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA) 
prohibited “any person in the United States . . . to trade, or attempt to trade; either directly or 
indirectly, with…an enemy or ally of enemy.”  Id. at 412.  Additionally, TWEA specifically 
restricted licenses of “enemy” insurance companies in section 4, foreign exchange of precious 
metals in section 5, property transfers in section 5 and 9, and other transactions with those 
designated as the “enemy.”  Id. at 413–20. 
 4. German Insurance Companies Proclamation, 40 Stat. 1684, 1685 (1917) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C.S. § 4304 (2019)).  Of course, the United States directed its trade restrictions 
against the Germans, who were perceived as the aggressors in the “Great War.” 
 5. See generally David W. Dent & Carol O’Brien, The Politics of the U.S. Trade Embargo 
of Cuba, 1959–1977, VOL. L TOWSON U. J. INT’L AFF. 166, 169 (2016).  Interestingly, then-
President Eisenhower delegated dealing with Castro to then-Vice President Richard Nixon.  Id. at 
168.  If Eisenhower was suspicious of Castro and of communism, Nixon was even more suspicious, 
stating during the 1960 Presidential campaign that the United States should “move vigorously . . . 
to eradicate this ‘cancer’ in our own hemisphere.”  Id.  This attitude, permeating the Eisenhower 
administration, sparked additional trade actions towards Cuba.  Id. 
 6. Id. at 167.  However, “[t]he irony of the policy of economic denial against the Cuban 
economy was that no one seemed to question its consequences and the simple fact that the trade 
embargo produced the exact circumstances that it was supposed to eliminate.”  Id. at 172. 
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under the authority of U.S. legislation known as the Export Control Act of 1949, 
Eisenhower instituted a complete ban on U.S. exports to Cuba.7  The blockade 
additionally enacted controls on the import of sugar from Cuba into the United 
States.8  American lawmakers believed, in theory, that this could cripple the 
Cuban economy as well as strangle Castro’s communist movement in Cuba and  
affect Castro’s ties with the Soviet Union.9  Again, these efforts reflected the 
then-current U.S. worldview, and were pursued not only to affect trade, perhaps, 
but also most likely to impose U.S. foreign policy goals in the region that was 
located just a bit too close for comfort. 
Following Eisenhower’s efforts, President John F. Kennedy continued the 
same sanctions and trade path with respect to Cuba.10  In March of 1962, under 
Kennedy’s leadership, the United States imposed a full embargo against Cuba.11  
To do so, President Kennedy invoked the authority of the TWEA.12  By 1963, 
these continuing and escalating bans13 on both imports and exports from Cuba 
resulted in the virtual disappearance of Cuban products from the U.S. market.14 
                                                        
 7. 43 Dep’t St. Bull. 715, 716 (1960); see Export Control Act, Pub. Law. No. 86-464, 74 
Stat. 130 (repealed 1969). 
 8. Dent & O’Brien, supra note 5, at 169–70.  Reviewing “[t]he debates that ensued [in the 
House of Representatives] reveal that the Cuban policy of the United States was clearly moving 
into a new stage of retaliation and hostility toward the Castro government . . . [and towards] support 
[for] some form of economic strangulation of Cuba.”  Id. at 170. 
 9. Id. at 172.  Members of Congress clearly viewed Castro as nothing more than a puppet of 
the Russian government and felt that economic measures would not only weaken Castro and his 
government but the seemingly growing alliance between Castro and Russia.  Id. at 170. 
 10. Id. at 171.  However, Kennedy’s approach appeared to be more political than economic, 
because he seemed to believe that Cuba, ninety miles from the United States, could be a base for 
Communist subversion not only in the United States but also among other nations of the Western 
Hemisphere.  Id. 
 11. Embargo On All Trade With Cuba, Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962); 
Dent & O’Brien, supra note 5, at 169; Anna P. Schreiber, Economic Coercion As An Instrument of 
Foreign Policy: U.S. Economic Measures Against Cuba and the Dominican Republic, 25 WORLD 
POL. 387, 389 (1973).  The Kennedy administration “made it illegal to import any product of Cuban 
or partial Cuban origin from any part of the world.”  Id. at 387.  Although the Kennedy 
administration tried to persuade the Organization of American States (OAS) to join in this full trade 
embargo, because of Latin American opposition, the OAS did not encourage the imposition of a 
full trade embargo by its members until 1964.  Id. at 389. 
 12. Schreiber, supra note 11, at 389.  See Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 
65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-44 (2012)). 
 13. Natalie Maniaci, The Helms-Burton Act: Is the U.S. Shooting Itself in the Foot?, 35 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 897, 898 (1998).  Notably, “[e]ight American presidents and a succession of 
Congresses have tried unsuccessfully for nearly four decades to legislate Fidel Castro out of 
existence.”  Id.  The eight Presidents included Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, 
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, not to mention Eisenhower’s efforts as well.  Id. 
 14. Schreiber, supra note 11, at 395–96.  Likewise, the U.S. trade policies also affected the 
Cuban marketplace.  Before the trade bans, “Cuba had relied on U.S. trade for a wide variety of 
food products and consumer goods.”  Id. at 397.  Similar to the disappearance of Cuban goods in 
the U.S. markets, “[d]urable consumer goods practically disappeared from [Cuban] stores in 1961, 
and basic consumer items such as soap, toothpaste, and clothing had to be rationed.”  Id.  After the 
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Following the initial flurry of trade sanctions against Cuba in the Fifties and 
the Sixties, the United States, in 1992, took further extraterritorial action when 
Congress passed the Cuban Democracy Act.15  That statute completely blocked 
trade between Cuba and any and all overseas firms “owned or operated by U.S. 
residents or nationals.”16  Of particular concern, not only to Cuba but also to the 
international trading community, was the language in the Cuban Democracy Act 
stating that subsidiaries of U.S. companies based abroad that had previously 
traded with Cuba could be prosecuted under U.S. law for continuing to do so.17  
With this action, the United States appeared to move significantly further, and 
in a much more visible way, into a position of extraterritorial influence—and 
perhaps interference—in international trade. 
In addition to this trade embargo’s history over the course of the twentieth 
century and the twenty-first century, the U.S. government has simultaneously 
employed two other primary methods of restricting trade with Cuba: foreign 
assets control regulations and export control regulations.  An examination of 
these two methods and how they transpired with respect to that nation provides 
a useful backdrop to the current situation regarding the U.S. sanctions against 
Iran and the possible impact of the newly resurrected EU blocking statute and 
its offspring legislation in particular European countries. 
First, the United States historically has utilized foreign assets control 
regulations to restrict trade.  Under the continuing and omnipresent authority of 
the TWEA, the United States in 1999 created the Cuban Assets Control 
Regulations (CACRs) in an effort to further restrict Cuban trade.18  The CACRs 
were strict in nature, restricting any exports from the United States to Cuba of 
products, technology, and services, or imports of the same into the United States, 
plus imposing a complete freeze on all Cuban assets in the United States or 
controlled by U.S. citizens.19  As well, the CACRs imposed travel bans on U.S. 
                                                        
U.S. embargo, Cuba continued to have trade relationships not only with the Soviet Union, but with 
some non-Communist states as well, including Spain, Canada, Japan, England, and France.  Id. at 
398–99. 
 15. Cuban Democracy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-484, §§ 1701–12, 106 Stat. 2575 (1992) (codified 
as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6010 (Supp. V. 1993)). 
 16. Maniaci, supra note 13, at 899. 
 17. 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a).  This language is parallel to the language of the EU blocking statute 
described infra in Section II.B.  As one might expect, the Cuban Democracy Act engendered much 
the same reaction by the international community as the present-day U.S. withdrawal from the 
JCPOA and re-imposition of sanctions against Iran—namely that the United States, through its 
sanctions provisions, was interfering with the sovereign affairs of other countries in trying to 
control entities incorporated outside of the United States, but owned or controlled by U.S. nationals.  
See Julia P. Herd, The Cuban Democracy Act: Another Extraterritorial Act that Won’t Work, 20 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 397, 397 (1994). 
 18. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1999). 
 19. Id.  This part of the regulations was particularly concerning to the international 
community, since the regulation stated the following about who exactly was subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States: 
The term person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States includes: 
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nationals for travel to Cuba.20  The U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets 
Control administered the CACRs.21 
The CACRs also affected licenses to export goods to Cuba.  In 1975, the U.S. 
government eliminated general licenses to do business with Cuba.22  After that 
repeal, companies needed to apply for specific licenses in order to do business 
with Cuba.  However, under the then-present regulations, such licenses would 
only be granted “if the foreign firm operated independently of its U.S. parent 
with respect to its decision-making, risk-taking, negotiation and financing.”23  
This tool, therefore, attempted to control foreign, rather than wholly domestic 
entities, in much the same way as the post-JCPOA sanctions are intended to 
operate.  Further, with the 1992 passage of the Cuban Democracy Act, as noted 
above, an absolute prohibition upon the issuance of any license to any foreign 
affiliates of a U.S. firm became the law.24 
Second, the United States historically has also utilized export control 
regulations as a trade strategy with Cuba.  In addition to the CACRs, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce operates a separate export control and licensing office 
now known as the Bureau of Industry and Security, which administers export 
administration rules.  That office, with respect to Cuba in particular, governs 
export and re-export of goods to Cuba when the U.S. content is 20 percent or 
                                                        
(a) Any individual, wherever located, who is a citizen or resident of the United States; 
(b) Any person within the United States as defined in § 515.330; 
(c) Any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any State, 
territory, possession, or district of the United States; and 
(d) Any corporation, partnership, or association, wherever organized or doing business, 
that is owned or controlled by persons specified in paragraph (a) or (c) of this section. 
Id. at § 515.329 (emphasis added).  This language became particularly contentious even with U.S. 
allies.  For a discussion of trade restrictions on Cuba and how it affected U.S.-Canadian trade 
relations, see John W. Boscariol, An Anatomy of a Cuban Pyjama Crisis: Reconsidering Blocking 
Legislation in Response to Extraterritorial Trade Measures of the United States, 30 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS., 439 (1999). 
 20. 31 C.F.R. § 515.415; see also Office of Foreign Control, Specially Designated Nationals 
and Blocked Persons, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY (1998), http://www.ustreas.gov/ofac 
(discussing companies that the Treasury views as acting on behalf of Cuban authorities in 
international trade). 
 21. Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), U.S. 
DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-
structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Foreign-Assets-Control.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) 
(explaining that “[t]he Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the 
Treasury administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and 
national security goals against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international 
narcotics traffickers, those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and other threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United 
States.”). 
 22. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.541, repealed by 40 Fed. Reg. 47, 108 (1975). 
 23. Boscariol, supra note 19, at 447. 
 24. Id. 
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more of the total value of the good being exported.25   Again, utilizing the 
authority of both the TWEA as well as the Export Administration Act, entities 
desiring to export or re-export items to Cuba, subject to the provisions of the 
Export Administration Act, must obtain a license from the Department of 
Commerce to do so, with very limited exceptions.26  The exceptions, still in 
existence today, include such things as temporary exports and re-exports by the 
news media, items of baggage, humanitarian donations, items used by 
international organizations, vessel and aircraft parts, and excepted agricultural 
commodities.27  Further, reinforcing the stringent nature of the licensing scheme, 
the applicable regulations state that any licenses granted by the Department of 
Commerce are subject to a policy of general denial.28 
Further, in 1996, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act.29  
This effort at restraining trade with Cuba as a thinly-disguised means to topple 
the Castro regime was enacted when Cuba shot down two U.S. civilian airplanes 
in February of 1996.30  The Act’s main purpose, as with many of the U.S. actions 
regarding Cuba, was not only to strengthen sanctions against Cuba, but also to 
destabilize the Cuban government.31 
B. International Efforts to Contain U.S Extraterritorial Trade Reach 
Over time, the international community, primarily the EU, fought back against 
what appeared to be blatant violations of international norms regarding trade 
restrictions by the United States through enactment of various legislative 
                                                        
 25. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 746.2(b)(3)(ii) (1996). 
 26. Id. § 746.2(a). 
 27. Id. § 746.2 (a)(1)(i) – (xiv); Id. § 746.2(a)(2). 
 28. Id. § 746.2(b). 
 29. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) (Helms-Burton) Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–91, 1643, 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (1996)). 
 30. Maniaci, supra note 13, at 899–900.  The matter was memorialized in a lawsuit filed in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 
996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).  The Alejandre case presented a suit against the Cuban 
government and its air force to recover damages for loss of life in connection to an aggression by 
the Cuban air force.  Id. at 1242.  Four rescue pilots who were flying civilian unarmed planes on a 
humanitarian mission in international airspace between Florida and Cuba were killed without 
warning.  Id.  In a default judgment, the court awarded over $187 million in compensatory and 
punitive damages to the families of the pilots.  Id. at 1253. 
 31. Maniaci, supra note 13, at 900.  The Act’s purposes were laid out more completely than 
just the issue of strengthening sanctions.  In fact, in its ‘Purposes’ statement, the Helms-Burton Act 
in its original text claimed as its purposes, inter alia, that it would assist the Cuban people in 
regaining their freedom and prosperity so that they could “join” the communities of democratic 
nations within the Western Hemisphere, and that it would help provide for the continued national 
security of the United States in light of continued threats from the Castro government.  Helms-
Burton Act § 6022. 
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schemes to counteract the various U.S efforts.  These legislative pushback 
schemes took the form of both blocking and clawback statutes.32 
A comparison between these two types of statutes is informative here, 
especially since the EU has reauthorized these same legislative initiatives to deal 
with U.S. re-imposition of anti-Iran sanctions.  Blocking statutes are retaliatory 
in nature.  At their simplest, they prevent a country’s nationals from complying 
with foreign regulatory schemes.  At a more nuanced level, they serve as a 
political statement against exterritorial assertions by another country and protect 
both a country’s nationals and a country’s economy.33  Clawback statutes go 
hand-in-hand with blocking statutes; layered on top of blocking statutes, 
clawbacks allow persons or entities that suffer economic loss from compliance 
with the blocking statute to recover damages incurred by such compliance.34 
As early as 1980, the United Kingdom acted to prevent the United States from 
exerting extraterritorial jurisdiction over international trade by U.K. entities.  In 
1980, the U.K. government enacted the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 
1980.35  The preamble to the Act clearly reflected the U.K. opposition to any 
U.S. or other counties efforts to control the flow of international trade. 36  
Explaining that the statute was intended to protect the U.K. and counter any 
efforts “imposed or given under the laws of countries outside the United 
Kingdom and affecting the trading or other interests of persons in the United 
Kingdom,” the preamble to the Act referred generally to overseas countries, but 
was clearly aimed at the United States.37  The statute addressed extraterritorial 
efforts to control the trade of British entities and denoted its applicability to any 
measures proposed, taken, or to be taken that could damage the trading interests 
of the U.K.38 
Subsequent to the U.K.’s enactment of that particular piece of legislation, but 
tangentially related to it, the United States and the U.K.  engaged in a judicial 
                                                        
 32. Maniaci, supra note 13, at 911–13, 916–18.  This may have foreshadowed the EU’s 
current iteration of blocking legislation in response to the Iran situation, as detailed infra at Section 
I.C. 
 33. Id. at 911 (“A blocking statute is a retaliatory measure whose underlying goals are to 
protect the State’s nationals from objectionable foreign legislation, and to compel the foreign State 
to cede its claims to regulate aspects of the affected State’s economy.”).  
 34. Id. (“A clawback statute allows for a right of recovery in the affected State’s courts of any 
sum of money paid in satisfaction of a judgment under the objectionable foreign legislation.”). 
 35. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c. 11 (United Kingdom), reprinted at 
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/11. 
 36. Id.  Basically, the Protection of Trading Interests Act gave the U.K. Secretary of State the 
power to invoke the act against exterritorial measures by a foreign state concerning trade.  Id. § 1. 
 37. Id.  The Act dances around naming the United States but does state that it applies to “any 
overseas country…regulating or controlling international trade” in matters affecting things “outside 
the territorial jurisdiction of that country . . . .”  Id. §§ 1(1)(a), 1(1)(b). 
 38. Id. § 1(1).  The statute required those affected to report to the U.K. Secretary of State 
regarding which requirements or prohibitions were interfering with trade, id. § 1(2), after which 
time the Secretary of State could give directions to the reporting entity “prohibiting compliance” 
with such statutes of any overseas country.  Id. § (3). 
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battle over extraterritorial imposition of U.S. antitrust laws in the various 
lawsuits surrounding the demise of Laker Airways,39 a low-cost British airline 
that created a world-wide stir with its economy transcontinental flight service.  
In 1982, the liquidator of Laker Airways Ltd. brought suit in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that a number of international 
airlines, including several British-based companies, had engaged in predatory 
pricing and other conspiratorial actions in violation of major U.S. antitrust 
statutes, the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts.40  The airlines involved in the 
original lawsuits attempted to seek from the U.K.’s courts an injunction to 
restrict Laker Airways from pursuing its antitrust action in U.S. courts.41  The 
challenging airlines were in fact successful in getting an injunction from the 
British Court of Appeals, enabling them in effect to “circumvent the jurisdiction 
of the U.S courts instead of directly challenging it.”42  The grant of the injunction 
by the British courts, plus the blocking statute already enacted via the Protection 
of Trading Interests Act of 1980, demonstrated the U.K.’s determination to 
counter the attempted reach of the United States either through direct 
interference with trade or through the U.S. court system. 
                                                        
 39. Robert Cannon, Laker Airways and the Courts: A New Method of Blocking the 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 7 J. COMP. BUS. & CAP. MKT. L. 63, 64 (1985).  
Laker Airways was an international air carrier that provided low-cost airline transportation between 
London and New York.  Id. at 64.  At one time, Laker flew about one of seven passengers traveling 
between England and the United States.  Id.  When Laker attempted to expand to other routes, Pan 
American, TWA, and British Air (all international carriers as well) lowered their fares so that they 
equaled Laker’s fares.  Id. at 65.  This, of course, had a detrimental effect upon Laker’s expansion 
plans as well as its bottom line, and Laker was forced to enter into a refinancing scheme to keep 
the business afloat.  Id.  According to Laker’s version of the story, its competitors attempted to 
block this refinancing.  Id.  As a result, the refinancing failed, and Laker was forced to declare 
bankruptcy.  Id.  After that, various antitrust suits were brought in the U.S. courts against the other 
involved international air carriers.  See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 
F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983). 
 40. Cannon, supra note 39, at 63.  The author’s point is that the Laker lawsuits “highlight[ed] 
the irreconcilable conflict between U.S. and British theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the 
area of antitrust law.”  Id. at 67.  His argument could also extend beyond antitrust law to the law of 
sanctions.  As he further elaborated, the British position is that principles of international law “limit 
a state’s power to prescribe laws regulating economic behavior that occurs outside its territory” 
whereas the U.S. position is that “international law does not prohibit the exercise of jurisdiction 
over conduct that produces harmful effects on domestic commerce.”  Id.  In the conundrum 
presented by the JCPOA withdrawal and re-institution of sanctions against Iran, this argument 
could be extended to say that the U.S. position is that international law does not prohibit the exercise 
of jurisdiction over conduct that produces harmful effects on domestic commerce or otherwise 
affects the perceived safety and security of the United States. 
 41. Id. at 65.  The lawsuits originally involved two British airlines and two other European 
airlines, and eventually morphed into lawsuits against approximately eight international air carriers.  
Id. at 80 n.3.  The original lawsuits were filed in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.  Id. at 65. 
 42. Id. at 63.  The decision of the British Court of Appeals was subsequently overruled by the 
House of Lords.  Id. at 67.  However, the U.K. government had made its stand with respect to 
another attempt by the United States to exert extraterritorial jurisdiction, this time within the courts. 
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Although blocking and clawback statutes, such as the Protection of Trading 
Interests Act, previously had been enacted to protect countries’ trading interests 
generally,43 enactment of the Helms-Burton Act by the United States Congress 
quickly and affirmatively fired up the international community, causing 
countries to enact such statutes as a direct and targeted response to that particular 
piece of legislation.  Seen by international trading partners as an “outrageous 
example of United States extraterritorial reach,”44 Canada, Mexico, and the EU 
responded to the Helms-Burton Act with their own defensive legislative 
schemes.45  Those three entities enacted laws declaring the Helms-Burton Act 
null and void in an attempt to cripple the impact of what was perceived 
internationally as illegal U.S. international trade moves.46                                                                                                    
Of particular historical relevance to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and 
resultant renewed trade sanctions, in 1996, the EU passed its Council Regulation 
2271/96,47 completely new legislation enacted solely to counteract the impact of 
the Helms-Burton Act.48  The opening language of that legislation is exacting in 
its denigration of the extraterritorial trade actions of the U.S. behaviors 
expressed in the Helms-Burton Act.  The European Regulation asserted that the 
legislation “violat[ed] international law and imped[ed] the attainment of” 
harmonious world trade and abolition of barriers thereto.49  The Regulation 
Annex (setting forth particulars of the legislation’s reach) specifically referred 
to the U.S. sanctions on Cuba, Iran, and Libya as the foreign legislation targeted 
by the Regulation.50  It is notable that the EU specifically named not just the 
Helms-Burton Act, but also included reference to the 1992 Cuban Democracy 
Act as targets of the Regulation.  Clearly, the EU had reached its collective limits 
with respect to U.S. trade encroachment on what were perceived as issues of 
                                                        
 43. See Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c. 11 (United Kingdom), reprinted at 
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/11.  The 1980 U.K. blocking statute, with a clawback 
provision, was the first blocking statute of the modern era.  It afforded U.K. citizens legal protection 
from the impact of extraterritorial laws of any country.  Maniaci, supra note 13, at 911–12. 
 44. Maniaci, supra note 13, at 909. 
 45. Id. at 909–10.  The legislation passed included both blocking and clawback legislation 
and forbade nationals of the enacting country to comply with the Helms-Burton Act.  Id. 
 46. Id. at 912.  In a possibly interesting precursor to modern day U.S. sanctions moves, the 
British acknowledged that its blocking statute might not be the only way to counter aggressive 
exterritorial enforcement by the United States of trade law; nevertheless, the U.K. government 
“viewed the blocking statute as the best and only way, at that time, to protect the legitimate interests 
of the United Kingdom.”  Id. 
 47. Council Regulation No. 2271/96, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1, 2 (EC).  The regulation states in its 
preamble that “the objectives of [the EU] include contributing to the harmonious development of 
world trade and to the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade.”  Id. 
 48. Maniaci, supra note 13, at 916.  The Council Regulation incorporates two blocking 
provisions and a clawback provision. Id. 
 49. Council Regulation No. 2271/96, supra note 47, at 2. 
 50. Id. at 8–9.  The legislation specifically mentioned in the Annex includes the Cuban Liberty 
and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, and 
the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.  Id. 
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sovereignty and international free trade, and finally attempted to fight back 
forcefully.51                                                            
Following the aforementioned international legislative developments, some 
litigation did arise within the U.S. court system stemming from enforcement of 
the TWEA and the CACRs.  Though the cases dealt with fairly specific Cuban 
trading issues, they resulted in some notable judicial findings as the judiciary 
grappled with extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. laws.  In United States v. 
Plummer,52 a criminal case, the Eleventh Circuit, directly responding to the 
defendant’s assertion that a section of the charging statute could not be applied 
extraterritorially, stated: “Congress unquestionably has the authority to enforce 
its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.”53  Further, the 
court noted that the TWEA provided the President broad authority and broad 
powers consistent with the constitutional powers granted to the chief executive 
with respect to foreign affairs.54  These broad statements by the Plummer court 
fully supported the expansive nature of U.S. international trade policy. 
Additionally, in 2001, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided the case 
of United States v. Brodie.55  In Brodie, the court denied a motion to dismiss 
charges against a defendant under the TWEA and the CACRs.  In determining 
that the court had jurisdiction over a case involving a defendant’s “wholly” 
extraterritorial conduct, the court applied a two-part test.56  First, according to 
Brodie, the court must consider congressional intent regarding extraterritorial 
application of the statute at hand.57  Finding that, the court then determines if the 
defendant’s conduct had effects in the United States.58  Invoking Plummer, the 
Brodie court asserted that the jurisdiction test was met in Brodie because 
                                                        
 51. Likewise, in 1996, the U.K. extended its earlier blocking legislation, the U.K. Protection 
of Trading Interests Act of 1980, focusing on these U.S. extraterritorial actions.  The Extraterritorial 
U.S. Legislation (Sanctions Against Cuba, Iran and Libya) (Protection of Trading Interests) Order 
1996, No. 3171, www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1996/3171/made. 
 52. United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2000).  In that case, the 
defendant was charged with two criminal counts: attempting to smuggle Cuban cigars into the 
United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 545 and unauthorized transportation of Cuban merchandise 
in violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act.  Id. 
 53. Id. at 1304.  It should be noted that in this particular case, the court grappled with the 
extraterritorial application of federal criminal laws, not specifically laws affecting extraterritorial 
trading.  Id. 
 54. Id. at 1309.  One could read the court’s decision to support both a President’s powers 
under the TWEA as well as with respect to foreign relations in general.  Id. at 1307.  The court 
additionally noted that attempts in other cases to “second-guess” the CACRs, asserting that they 
have no rational purpose, have been rejected because of, inter alia, the President’s broad powers in 
foreign affairs.  Id. at 1309. 
 55. United States v. Brodie, 174 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
 56. Id. at 304–05. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  In a footnote to its opinion, the district court stated that “[w]here Congress has 
explicitly stated its intention to overrule international law, no effects test is required.”  Id. at 304 
(citing United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
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violation of TWEA and the CACRs has domestic effects no matter where the 
violation occurs.59   Again, this judicial view of U.S. international authority 
further illustrates an expansive view of U.S. extraterritorial authority.                                                       
Historically, however, while the United States forcefully threatened or 
enforced its portfolio of extraterritorial trade legislation and regulation, the EU 
had less success in counteracting U.S. efforts to legislate international trade.60  
Although the EU blocking statute required corporations and others “affected, 
directly or indirectly, by the laws specified in the Annex . . . [to] inform the [EU] 
Commission”61 of such efforts,  no such reports were made to the EU.62  Further, 
the Commission opened numerous investigations into companies that they 
suspected were in breach of the blocking statute, but none of these investigations 
yielded any action by the EU.  As a result, the net effect of the EU blocking 
statute was clearly undermined. 63                                                                                                                                
 The sole attempt at enforcement of the EU blocking statute occurred in 2007, 
by the government of Austria, attempting to impose Austrian law consistent with the 
provisions of that statute.64  The Austrian government brought charges against the fifth-
largest Austrian bank, BAWAG P.S.K., in an attempt to enforce Austrian law punishing 
offenses of the EU blocking statute.  BAWAG closed the bank accounts of one hundred 
Cuban nationals while in the process of being acquired by a U.S. investor.  Because of 
U.S. anti-Cuban sanctions, having such accounts would have prevented the bank’s 
acquisition.  When Austria attempted to pursue its enforcement action, the Austrian 
public revolted.  At the same time, the United States, in a seemingly reversal of attitude, 
granted the bank an exemption to the existent Cuban sanctions which would allow the 
acquisition to proceed.  BAWAG then reinstated the accounts of the Cuban nationals, 
resulting in no enforcement by the Austrian government and the subsequent acquisition 
of the bank.65  Thus, the entire effort of the EU to thwart U.S. extraterritorial efforts with 
respect to Cuban sanctions ground to an unceremonious halt with but one attempted—
and failed—enforcement action by Austria, a member of the EU. 
                                                        
 59. Brodie, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 305. 
 60. Maniaci, supra note 13, at 917. 
 61. Council Regulation No. 2271/96, supra note 47, at 3. 
 62. Maniaci, supra note 13, at 917. 
 63. Id.  “The concern [by the European Commission] was that European companies obeying 
Helms-Burton might set a dangerous precedent by encouraging the United States to use further 
legal mechanisms to promote foreign policy in other areas of the world.”  Id.  Ultimately, President 
Clinton and the EU reached an understanding in which the United States would waive part of the 
Helms-Burton act specifically for EU companies.  Id. at 917–18. 
 64. Pursuant to Article 9 of the European Commission Regulation No. 2271/96, “[e]ach 
Member State shall determine the sanctions to be imposed in the event of breach of any relevant 
provisions of this Regulation.”  Council Regulation No. 2271/96, supra note 47, at 6. 
 65. Press Release, Foreign Ministry Press Dep’t, Fed. Ministry for Eur. Integration and 
Foreign Aff., Rep. of Austria, Foreign Ministry ceases investigations against BAWAG bank (June 
2, 2007), https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/the-ministry/press/announcements/2007/foreign-ministry-ceases-
investigations-against-bawag-bank/. 
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C. Current International Situation: The Iran Sanctions Re-Emerge 
Closely tied to the historical situation in Cuba and also to past U.S. relations 
with the country of Iran, the United States has recently begun to disentangle 
itself from an Obama-era treaty known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (“JCPOA” colloquially known as the Iran Nuclear Deal).  The 
agreement, finalized on July 14, 2015, sought to curtail the Iranian nuclear 
program in exchange for relaxed economic and trade sanctions by the signatory 
countries, of which the United States was one.66 
However, on May 8, 2018, President Donald J. Trump ceremoniously 
announced the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and 
the reinstatement of U.S. sanctions on Iran.67  President Trump issued a series 
of Presidential Memoranda that directed the Secretary of State and the Secretary 
of the Treasury “immediately [to] begin taking steps to re-impose all United 
States sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA.”68  On that same 
day, the Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 
issued explanatory guidance on the re-imposed sanctions.69 
Pursuant to the Presidential Memoranda, OFAC crafted a two-part wind-down 
period for withdrawal from the JCPOA, to be effected in 90-day and 180-day 
increments.70  Effective August 6, 2018, OFAC revoked certain licenses and 
authorizations for sale and trade of certain goods to or from Iran that had been 
issued consistent with the JCPOA, as well as re-imposed certain primary and 
secondary sanctions. 71   Effective November 4, 2018, OFAC re-imposed 
                                                        
 66. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N 
(May 9, 2018), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance.  The agreement was 
reached by Iran and the P5+1, which consisted of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.  Id. 
 67. Babak Hoghooghi, U.S. Withdrawal from JCPOA and Re-Imposition of U.S. Sanctions 
Suspended in 2016, 34 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 446 (Aug. 2018). 
 68. Presidential Memoranda, Ceasing U.S. Participation in the JCPOA and Taking 
Additional Action to Counter Iran’s Malign Influence and Deny Iran All Paths to a Nuclear 
Weapon, Section 3: Restoring United States Sanctions (May 8, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/ceasing-U-S-participation-jcpoa-taking-
additional-action-counter-irans-malign-influence-deny-iran-paths-nuclear-weapon/.  The President 
further directed the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury to re-impose sanctions 
“under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, the Iran Sanctions Act of 
1996, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and the Iran Freedom and 
Counter-proliferation Act of 2012.”  Id. 
 69. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to the 
May 8, 2018 National Security Presidential Memorandum Relating to the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA), U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (last updated Aug. 6, 2018), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/programs/documents/jcpoa_winddown_faqs.pdf. 
 70. Id; see also Hoghooghi, supra note 67, at 446. 
 71. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of Sanctions, supra note 69; 
Hoghooghi, supra note 67, at 446. 
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additional secondary sanctions. 72   Most consequentially, the 180-day stage 
marked the revocation of General License H authorized under the JCPOA.  That 
license pertained directly to U.S. owned or controlled foreign entities and their 
authority to engage in certain transactions with the government of Iran, which 
would otherwise be prohibited by 31 C.F.R. § 560.215.73  The revocation forced 
those entities to cease immediately all business relationships with Iran,74  and 
created civil penalties for a violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran.75 
The EU quickly responded to the May 8, 2018 U.S. unilateral action.  In a 
swift and definitive declaration dated May 9, 2018, the High Representative of 
the EU reconfirmed the EU’s commitment to the JCPOA.76  Shortly thereafter, 
the foreign and economic affairs ministers of France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, as well as the High Representative of the EU, sent a joint letter to the 
U.S. Secretaries of State and the Treasury requesting that there be no 
enforcement of the extraterritorial effects of the re-imposed sanctions.77  In 
response, the United States rejected the European plea and emphasized a U.S. 
policy of no exceptions save in limited national security or humanitarian cases.78 
                                                        
 72. Hoghooghi, supra note 67, at 446.  The secondary sanctions involved transactions 
regarding shipping, shipbuilding, petroleum and energy; transactions between foreign financial 
institutions and the Bank of Iran; other financial limits regarding transfer of funds in and out of 
Iran; and insurance restrictions.  Id. 
 73. Prohibition on Foreign Entities Owned or Controlled by U.S. Persons, 31 C.F.R. § 
560.215 (2018). 
 74. Hoghooghi, supra note 67, at 446. 
 75. Id. 
 76. European Council Press Release 251/18, Declaration by the High Representative 
onBehalf of the EU Following U.S. President Trump’s Announcement on the Iran Nuclear Deal 
(JCPOA) (May 9, 2018).  In fact, one EU official stated that “if EU companies abide by U.S. . . . 
sanctions they will, in turn, be sanctioned by the EU.”  Nathalie Tocci, Aide to Federica Mogherini, 
quoted in Jacqueline Thomsen, EU Issues Warning to European Companies that Comply with new 
U.S. Sanctions on Iran,” THE HILL (Aug. 7, 2018), 
http://thehill.com/policy/international/europe/400704-eu-threatens-to-sanction-european- 
companies-that-comply-with-new. 
 77. Letter from Bruno Le Maire, et al., Minister of Economy and Finance, France, to Steven 
Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury, U.S. and Mike Pompeo, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. (June 7, 
2018), https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article8665.  Notably, Boris Johnson, the British foreign 
secretary, authored an opinion piece in the New York Times in which he scathingly criticized the 
Trump administration for undermining the significant progress that had been made on curtailing 
the Iranian nuclear program through the JCPOA.  Boris Johnson, Opinion, Boris Johnson: Don’t 
Scuttle the Iran Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/06/ 
opinion/boris-johnson-trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html.  He commented that “[o]nly Iran would gain 
from abandoning the restrictions on its nuclear program” and that it is “[f]ar better to police the 
deal with the greatest rigor—and the I.A.E.A. has certified Iran’s compliance so far—while 
working together to counter Tehran’s belligerent behavior in the region.”  Id. 
 78. Dan De Luce, Abigail Williams & Andrea Mitchell, U.S. refuses European requests for 
exemptions from its new sanctions on Iran, NBC NEWS (July 14, 2018, 7:30 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-refuses-european-requests-exemptions-its-new-
sanctions-iran-n891371. 
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In rapid response to the United States, on June 6, 2018, the EU adopted an 
update to its original Cuba-era blocking statute by adding the U.S. 
extraterritorial sanctions on Iran to the scope of that statute by adoption of the 
Commission Delegated Regulation 2018/1100. 79   According to a European 
Commission press release, the “measures [were] meant to help protect[] the 
interests of EU companies investing in Iran and to demonstrate the EU’s 
commitment to the . . . (JCPOA).”80 
The updated and revitalized EU blocking statute entered into effect on August 
7, 2018 to counter the impact of re-imposed U.S. sanctions on Iran with respect 
to “EU companies doing legitimate business in Iran.”81  The EUs clarifying 
documents included two items, in addition to the amending regulation, that 
expanded and enhanced the scope of the original blocking statute: an authorizing 
regulation and a guidance note. 
The authorizing regulation, set forth in European Commission Implementing 
Regulation 2018/1101,82 is designed to protect “against the effects of the extra-
territorial application of legislation” promulgated by the United States. 83  
Specifically, the reauthorized blocking statute relieves “EU operators” from 
complying with extra-territorial legislation as listed in the Annex to the 
regulation (including the U.S.’s re-imposed Iran sanctions) or any penalties 
arising therefrom, because the EU “does not recognize its applicability to/effects 
towards EU operators.” 84   The amended blocking statute further renders 
ineffective in the EU any foreign court rulings based on the U.S. sanctions, and 
allows EU operators to recover damages and seek compensation for any losses 
caused by application of or rulings related to the sanctions.85  Despite the fact 
that EU law gives the blocking statute legal effect in all EU member states, that 
statute likewise affirmatively requires member states to adopt and implement in 
their individual countries their preferred methodologies for penalties of any 
                                                        
 79. European Commission Daily News MEX/18/4085, Upholding the EU’s Commitment to 
the Iran Nuclear Deal and Protecting the Interests of European Companies—Next Steps (June 6, 
2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEX_18_4085. 
 80. Id. 
 81. European Commission Press Release IP/18/4805, Updated Blocking Statute in support of 
Iran nuclear deal enters into force (Aug. 6, 2018), 
http://eueuropaeeas.fpfis.slb.ec.europa.eu:8084/delegations/japan/49162/updated-blocking-
statute-support-iran-nuclear-deal-enters-force_en. 
 82. The original Cuba-era Blocking Statute was Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96.  
Council Regulation No. 2271/96, supra note 47, at 5.  Council Regulation 2018/1101 clarifies the 
application of that original proclamation with regard to the recent Iran developments. Commission 
Regulation 2018/1101, 2018 O.J. (L199) 1,7 (EC). 
 83. Commission Regulation 2018/1101, supra note 82, at 1. 
 84. Official Journal of the European Union, Guidance Note—Questions and Answers: 
Adoption of Update of the Blocking Statute, 2018 O.J. (C277) 1, 2. 
 85. Id.  Note that the EU Blocking Regulation does not render foreign court rulings based on 
the U.S. sanctions invalid; it merely states that such judgments will not be recognized and cannot 
be enforced in the EU.  Of course, enforcement outside of the EU against EU companies is still a 
possibility. 
178 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 69:163 
possible breaches.86  Thus, under the revitalized blocking statute, the individual 
countries must enact their own implementing legislation and penalty scheme, 
and enforce the same, in accordance with their own national schemes of 
legislation.87  
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: THE REAL TRADE WARS 
A. EU Efforts to Enforce the Blocking Statute 
With the removal of the United States from the Iran Nuclear Deal, the EU 
finds itself in a peculiar situation regarding trade efforts with Iran.  In a statement 
issued after the United States announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA, the 
President of the EU stated that “[a]s long as the Iranians respect their 
commitments, the EU will of course stick to the agreement of which it was an 
architect.”88  Further, the EU President expressed the duty of the EU to protect 
European businesses in light of the U.S. sanctions.89  However, having embraced 
and signed off on the JCPOA, many of the major trading players in the EU have 
found themselves between the proverbial “rock and a hard place.”  Accordingly, 
“[t]he EU, which wants to preserve the nuclear deal, [worked] . . . with France 
and Germany on a plan that would allow companies to circumvent the U.S. 
sanctions.”90  In particular, France and Germany worked feverishly to come up 
with some scheme that would provide companies a work-around for the U.S. 
sanctions. 91   That work-around, known as INSTEX SAS (Instrument for 
Supporting Trade Exchanges), was announced on January 31, 2019, by the High 
Representative/Vice President of the EU, Federica Mogherini, as an instrument 
that would allow Member States of the EU to create legitimate trading 
relationships with the Iranian government and industry, with the initial 
                                                        
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. European Commission Press Release IP/18/3861, European Commission Acts to Protect 
the Interests of EU Companies Investing in Iran as Part of the EU’s Continued Commitment to the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (May 18, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-
3861_en.htm. 
 89. Id.  Emphasizing both the U.S.’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and decision to 
reinstate sanctions, the EU President emphasized that these actions have the “potential” to 
negatively affect European companies.  Id.  However, in the same announcement, the EU 
Commission expressed its continued belief that the United States remains a key ally and partner to 
the EU.  Id. 
 90. Matthew Karnitschnig, BASF Commits to Complying with US Sanctions on Iran, 
POLITICO (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/iran-donald-trump-sanctions-basf-
commits-to-complying/.  As the article notes, however, companies that generate income in the 
United States are keenly focused on being shielded from potential “legal jeopardy” in the United 
States.  Id.  The stakes for some large multinational companies are simply too high. 
 91. Id.  In addition to BASF, featured in the article, other large multinational companies are 
contemplating withdrawing from doing business with Iran.  Id. 
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“shareholders” of the trading instrument being France, Germany, and the U.K.92  
Because many large companies have centers of business both in the United 
States and in one or more European countries, this is a difficult issue for the EU 
to solve.  Critics of INSTEX have labeled this “special financial vehicle” as at 
best a modest attempt to preserve the trading aspects of the JCPOA.93  It remains 
to be seen if it will have any effect at all upon EU-Iran trade. 
The problem still remains that protecting European businesses with U.S. 
sanctions in effect is a difficult balancing act.  In its May 2018 press release, the 
European Union stated that it was moving forward on four fronts to counteract 
the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions on companies doing business in Iran.94  First, 
the EU updated its list of sanctions on Iran that come within the ambit of the 
blocking statute.95   Second, the EU began its effort to allow the European 
Investment Bank to determine whether it would “finance activities outside the 
European Union, in Iran.”96  Third, the EU determined that it would provide 
some stability to Iran in particular sectors, such as in the energy field, to indicate 
to Iran that the European Union would stand by its end of the JCPOA bargain.97  
And fourth, the European Commission promoted making bank transfers to the 
Central Bank of Iran to facilitate the receipt by Iran of oil revenues from 
European companies or countries that could otherwise be held up or stopped by 
the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions against Iran.98 
Of these various answers by the EU to the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions 
against Iran, the blocking statute itself could have the most impact on whether 
or not European companies would suffer under the U.S. sanctions scheme.  The 
                                                        
 92. European External Action Service, Statement by High Representative/Vice-President 
Federica Mogherini on the Creation of INSTEX, Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION EXTERNAL ACTION (Jan. 31, 2019), https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/57475/statement-high-representativevice-presdent-federica-
mogherini-creation-instex-instrument_en.  The stated purpose of this “Special Purpose Vehicle” 
was to continue EU commitment to the “full and effective implementation of the JCPOA in all its 
aspects” so long as Iran continued implementation of its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA.  
Id. 
 93. Keith Johnson, EU Offers Up a Meager Workaround to U.S. Iran Sanctions, FOREIGN 
POLICY (Jan. 31, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/31/eu-offers-up-a-meager-work-
around-to-u-s-iran-sanctions-spv-instex/. 
 94. European Commission Press Release IP/18/3861, supra note 88. 
 95. Id.  As noted infra at Section IIA, the Blocking Statute “forbids EU persons from 
complying with US extraterritorial sanctions, allows companies to recover damages arising from 
such sanctions from the person causing them, and nullifies the effect in the EU of any foreign court 
judgements [sic] based on them.”  Commission Regulation 2018/1101, supra note 81. 
 96. European Commission Press Release IP/18/3861, supra note 88.  If this is put into place, 
then the European Investment Bank could provide financing to European companies doing business 
in Iran.  Id. 
 97. Id.  In its Press Release, the European Commission called these “confidence building 
measures,” meant to assure Iran of the continuation of support consistent with the JCPOA.  Id. 
 98. Id.  This particular measure was designed to help Iran receive its oil-related revenues 
particularly in the event that U.S. sanctions target EU entities involved in oil-related transactions 
with Iran.  Id. 
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implementing regulation for the blocking statute includes a provision for EU 
companies to apply for an authorization from the European Commission 
allowing them to abide by the U.S. sanctions vice the EU Blocking Statute if 
they are “exceptionally authori[z]ed to do so by the Commission.” 99   This 
requires a showing of serious harm under the sanctions.  However, it is unclear 
how the European Commission will determine how compliance with the 
blocking statute would cause “serious harm” to any European entity in 
question.100  Additionally, it remains to be seen whether companies with a very 
strong United States connection would be more easily granted such 
“exceptional” authorizations.101 
Further, not all EU member states have enacted country-specific 
implementing legislation regarding penalties for noncompliance with the EU 
blocking statute as necessary for actual imposition of penalties by each separate 
country, as contemplated in the EU legislative scheme.  For those countries that 
actually have created a penalty system, the penalties span the range of severity.  
For example, in the U.K., a breach of the EU blocking statute equals a criminal 
                                                        
 99. European Commission Press Release IP/18/4805, supra note 81. 
 100. Another interesting aspect to the enforcement or lack thereof relative to the EU blocking 
statute is whether the courts will engage in the process of enforcing the EU legislation.  Recently, 
in December 2018, a U.K. judgment was issued from the High Court of Justice, the Business and 
Property Courts of England and Wales Commercial Division, concerning a marine insurance claim 
that related to U.S. sanctions.  Mamancochet Mining Ltd. v. Aegis Managing Agency Ltd. [2018] 
EWHC 2643 (Comm).  The Mamancochet decision dealt with several issues related to the U.S. 
withdrawal from the JCPOA and the re-imposition of sanctions against Iran, with the two most 
relevant ones being: 1) would payment of an insurance claim under an insurance contract expose 
an insurer to any trade restrictions; and 2) if the claim was in fact paid, would that expose the insurer 
to either U.S. or EU sanctions.  Id. at 2.  The claim was issued against the insurer and its policy 
underwriters on May 22, 2018, after Trump’s decision on May 8, 2018, to re-impose sanctions.  Id.  
The underwriters were a group of thirty defendants, of whom nine were U.S.-owned or controlled 
foreign entities, thus purportedly bringing those nine under the umbrella of the revived Iranian 
sanctions.  Id.  The court ultimately decided that the U.S. sanctions did not prohibit payment of the 
claim, and thus did not reach a determination on whether or not the EU Blocking Statute applied in 
this particular instance.  Id.  However, it is instructive to note that the judge stated—in what would 
be dicta in the American legal system—that in his view, there is: 
[C]onsiderable force in the Defendants’ “short answer” to the point, namely that the 
Blocking Regulation is not engaged where the insurer’s liability to pay a claim is 
suspended under a sanctions clause such as the one in the Policy.  In such a case, the 
insurer is not “complying” with a third country’s prohibition but is simply relying upon 
the terms of the policy to resist payment. 
Id. 
 101. Karnitschnig, supra note 90.  Additionally, it seems that some major European 
companies—primarily those that are German-based—have already decided that they will abide by 
the U.S. sanctions, including BASF, the giant chemical company; Daimler, a global automotive 
company; and Siemens, a worldwide engineering giant, among others.  Id.  These companies all 
gain massive revenues from their North American operations.  Id.  However, this could seriously 
impact the efforts of the European Commission to take a stand against U.S. extraterritorial reach 
via its re-imposed sanctions against Iran. 
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offense.102  In Germany, by contrast, a breach is viewed as an administrative 
offense.103   Therefore, a large company with a significant North American 
presence could escape punishment either through an exception granted by the 
EU on hardship grounds, or could receive merely the proverbial slap on the wrist 
if the prosecuting EU member country has a very lax penalty system in place. 
B. International Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
One alternative enforcement and settlement mechanism that has been 
attempted before, during the Cuban trade crisis, is the use of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and its claims resolution process.  In the past, however, 
neither the United States nor the EU used the full WTO dispute resolution 
process to settle claims arising with respect to the Helms-Burton Act, which, as 
noted above, was severely criticized by the international community as an illegal 
and inappropriate extraterritorial legislative effort by the United States. 
In 1996, after the passage of Helms-Burton, the EU challenged the 
extraterritorial aspects of the embargo on trade with Cuba at the WTO.104  The 
EU requested the establishment of a dispute settlement panel to take the Helms-
Burton Act and its international trading provisions under consideration.105  As 
part of that request, the EU sought to challenge the Helms-Burton Act and the 
CACRs (particularly sugar quotas and measures regarding passenger and 
freight-carrying vessels).106  In so challenging the U.S. extraterritorial measures, 
the EU relied on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 
1994), as well as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).107 
                                                        
 102. The Extraterritorial US Legislation (Sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya) (Protection 
of Trading Interests) Order 1996, SI 1996/3171, art. 2, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1996/ 
3171/made. 
 103. Außenwirtschaftsverordnung [AWV] [Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance], Aug. 2, 
2013, FED. LAW GAZETTE, as amended Dec. 13, 2017, [BAnz] at 20.12.2017 V1, § 82 (Ger.), 
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_awv/englisch_awv.html#p0894. 
 104. See Request for Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, United States—
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WTO Doc. WT/DS38/2 (Oct. 4, 1996); 
Boscariol, supra note 19, at 486. 
 105. Id. at 486.  This challenge by the EU was fashioned as a request to establish a panel to 
consider the consistency of the Helms-Burton actions by the United States with the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  The challenge was a wholesale attack not only on Helms-
Burton, but on the CACRs; imposition of sugar quotas (the origin of the trade battles with Cuba); 
prohibitions on ships entering or leaving Cuba; and some financial aspects of the U.S. embargo 
against Cuba.  Id. at 486–87. 
 106. Id. at 487.  The EU further maintained that not only were the trade embargo measures 
violative of both GATT 1994 and GATS, but they also presented an obstacle to benefits that “the 
EU and other WTO Members could have reasonably expected to have accrued under the specific 
WTO commitments of the United States and Cuba.”  Id. at 488. 
 107. Id.  The EU asserted in its complaint to the WTO that the Helms-Burton Act also affected 
things such as most-favored-nation treatment, market access, and national treatment, among others.  
Id. at 487–88. 
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In response, the United States countered that its extraterritorial measures were 
justified under the “national security exception.”108  Under principles of the 
WTO, a member state can decide for itself what constitutes a “national security 
exception.”109   At least some commentators have noted, however, there are 
objective criteria that should be considered in claiming such an exception.110  
First, the party claiming the national security exception should demonstrate that 
any such trade embargo (like the Cuban trade embargo memorialized in the 
Helms-Burton legislation) is a proportional response to the threat posed by the 
country penalized by the trade restrictions.111  Second, the party claiming the 
national security exception should demonstrate that the measures have been 
“taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.”112  These 
seem to be common-sense objectives, but because the WTO allows individual 
countries to make their own decisions and assertions regarding the national 
security exception, in practical fact these objectives are hard to enforce. 
Notably, the EU challenge to the U.S. measures within the Helms-Burton Act 
never reached full consideration by the WTO.  A series of negotiations between 
the EU and the U.S. resulted in an agreement to suspend the EU challenge in 
1997.113  This agreement ended the WTO process, foreclosing the use of the full 
array of WTO possibilities.  Whether this lack of a completed WTO settlement 
was due primarily to the fact that the WTO was a newly created organization, 
having only come into creation in 1994, or whether it was due to the EU deciding 
to move away from a challenge against the United States is still undetermined. 
C. Logical Possibilities for a Solution 
Considering the historical background as enumerated within, there are three 
logical possibilities for a solution to the current extraterritorial efforts of the 
United States with regard to re-imposition of the pre-JCPOA sanctions against 
Iran.  First, the EU itself or its members could enforce the current blocking 
statute.  Second, the United States could actually move away from its hard stance 
on penalizing sanction violations.  Third, the U.K., alone or perhaps in 
conjunction with the EU, could become the power player in challenging U.S. 
                                                        
 108. Id. at 488.  Both GATT 1994 and GATS provide a national security exception that can be 
utilized by any country when it considers particular actions necessary for the protection of its own 
essential security interests, as necessary in times of war or other emergency.  Id. 
 109. Id. at 489. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the Law of 
GATT: An analysis of GATT’s Security Exception, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 558, 580 (1991) (explaining 
that essential security interests focus on “immediate political-military conditions that a State deems 
important for its position in the world . . .”). 
 113. Id. at 489–90.  The race to the bargaining table was precipitated by the fact that the United 
States threatened not to participate in the WTO challenge, the possibility that the WTO might allow 
the United States to rely upon the national security exception, and basic uncertainty on both sides 
about the applicability of the national security exception.  Id. at 489. 
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trade restriction or manipulation in the same way that it held the original hard 
line against U.S. extraterritorial encroachment in the early 1980s. 
1. EU Enforcement 
As noted earlier, there has only been one attempt by the European 
Commission to challenge U.S. extraterritorial trade efforts.  In 1996, the EU 
requested that the WTO establish a dispute resolution panel with respect to the 
far-reaching impact of the Helms-Burton Act and the CACRs.114  At that time, 
the WTO, in its infancy, did not have an established record of successful dispute 
resolution.  As of this moment in time, however, the WTO has handled over 400 
disputes in a period of over twenty-three years.115  This means that WTO dispute 
resolution is perhaps a more viable avenue to pursue than it was in 1996, when 
the WTO was in its infancy, and that the international community has a much 
stronger belief in the WTO’s competency to achieve dispute resolution.  
Additionally, should the United States attempt to enforce its sanctions in the 
international arena, thus engaging the EU in a dispute, the WTO process could 
be one of the swiftest avenues of settlement; the average time for a WTO dispute 
resolution is about ten months, whereas national court systems or other 
international organizations can take years.116 
Of course, the lurking problem is that President Trump has also threatened to 
pull the United States out of the WTO.117  In August of 2018, President Trump 
stated that the WTO benefited everyone but the United States.118  In light of the 
Trump administration’s criticism of the WTO agreement and its processes, a 
WTO dispute resolution as a possible avenue to resolve the differences between 
the EU and the United States over the newly revived Iran sanctions might not be 
successful. 
Alternatively, EU member states could take the reins and be the entities that 
ardently enforce the EU blocking statute.  As previously noted, the European 
Commission, having only enacted a broad regulation as its blocking statute, has 
left it up to every member state to enact its own implementing legislation and its 
own penalty structure.  Given that with respect to U.S.-Cuba sanctions, very few 
                                                        
 114. Id. at 486. 
 115. The WTO can…Settle Disputes and Reduce Trade Tensions, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (last visited Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
10thi_e/10thi02_e.htm.  In the WTO’s own words, “WTO dispute settlement focuses countries’ 
attention on the rules.  Once a verdict has been announced, countries concentrate on complying 
with the rules, and perhaps later renegotiating them . . . .”  Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Trump Threatens to Pull US Out of World Trade Organization, BBC NEWS (Aug. 31, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45364150. 
 118. Id.  Trump asserted that the WTO rules against the United States too often, although 
according to the BBC analysis, the United States actually wins about ninety percent of the time 
when it is the complainant; conversely, it loses about ninety percent of the time when it is 
complained about.  Id.  Additionally, the United States has been blocking the appointment of judges 
to the WTO, which, of course, can impact upon its ability to do its international policing job.  Id. 
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EU member countries elected to take the responsibility for following through 
with single state implementing legislation, however, the precedent is not strong 
for there to be widespread action by individual countries this time around either. 
2. Softened U.S. Stance on Penalizing Sanction Violations 
In the buildup to the Trump announcement of U.S. withdrawal from the 
JCPOA and re-imposition of Iran sanctions, and even in the interim period 
between the first and second phases of re-implementation, the U.S. President 
repeatedly and adamantly announced that the United States would not yield to 
any pressure to back down on its hard stance against Iran.  The United States 
maintained that its national security interests required such a position.  After all, 
the few judicial decisions related to TWEA and the CACRs during the Helms-
Burton debacle focused at least in part on the language of TWEA as well as the 
nature of the harm that the statute aimed to prevent.119   In fact, the courts 
themselves recognized a congressional intent in that legislation based on 
national security.120 
Despite historical rhetoric, perhaps it is predictive that this time around, even 
prior to implementation of the full scope of sanctions against Iran, the United 
States provided some exemptions to certain countries. 121   However, the 
exemptions have been granted only to a handful of countries that are heavy 
importers of Iranian oil, including India, South Korea, Japan, and China; there 
were no exemptions or waivers granted to any EU country.122  Although these 
exemptions may have been motivated by other U.S. foreign policy goals, it still 
leaves the EU countries with little hope that the United States will soften its 
policies regarding the sanctions vis-à-vis the EU.  By leaving the EU countries 
out of the exemption equation, though, it is likely that other long-term historical 
relationships will deteriorate, and the long-standing transatlantic partnership that 
has existed between the United States and most of Europe could be severely 
compromised. 
3. Britain’s Role in Sanctions Counterattacks 
Long before the EU’s first round of blocking statutes against the United 
States, the U.K. took its very powerful stance against U.S. extraterritorial reach 
through its legislative initiatives and judicial interventions as outlined above.  
The U.K. was also one of the only countries to enact punishing implementing 
legislation during the era of the U.S.-Cuba sanctions and the EU’s 1996 blocking 
statute.  Given the likelihood that the U.K. post-Brexit (or without Brexit, as the 
case may be) will need to establish its own trading regulations and parameters, 
                                                        
 119. United States v. Brodie, 174 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
 120. Id. at 305. 
 121. Gardiner Harris, U.S. Reimposes Sanctions on Iran but Undercuts the Pain with Waivers, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/02/world/middleeast/us-iran-
sanctions-oil-waivers.html. 
 122. Id. 
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it could be possible that the U.K. will once again exert its considerable 
international muscle and demand that the United States not encroach on trading 
taking place outside of its borders or by entities that are not under the jurisdiction 
of the United States.  In fact, if the U.K. re-establishes itself as a unilateral entity 
apart from the EU, it may seek to assert its power and its leadership and could 
take the lead in challenging U.S. extraterritorial efforts at restricting 
international trade both post-JCPOA and into the future. 
III. THE SOLUTION: THE EU DEVELOPS SOME BACKBONE 
The issue of how to deal with the U.S.’s assertion of extraterritorial power 
requires the immediate attention of the EU.  Specifically, the only way in which 
the Unted States will back off its sanctions-based claims against multinational 
corporations is if one or more countries of the EU step up to enforce the EU’s 
own regulations—and in a meaningful rather than symbolic way.  Clearly, the 
movement of the U.K. out of the EU, now or in the future, will leave a power 
vacuum in the EU because the U.K. has been one of the stronger players in 
creating implementing legislation and issuing court decisions that directly 
challenge the power of the United States.  Of course, it will make a significant 
difference which country specifically fills that vacuum, given the foreign policy 
attitudes of the Trump administration.  It must be a country that is strong both 
economically and politically, and that country must impose stringent economic 
penalties against any violating multinational company in order for there to be 
any hope of the United States respecting the actions of the new lead player and 
taking their pushback seriously.  A unified EU should review the policies and 
purposes of the EU blocking statute against the backdrop of much noise from 
the Trump administration. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Iran Nuclear Deal, and its mutual promises among the members of the 
international community, including the United States, promised the lifting of 
certain trade sanctions against Iran in exchange for concessions by Iran 
regarding development of its nuclear program.  From the trade perspective, as 
well as from the perspective of greater nuclear security, that agreement was 
welcomed news to the international community.  However, the 2018 withdrawal 
by the United States from the Iran Nuclear Deal has dealt the international 
trading community a body blow.  The U.S. withdrawal means that the United 
States will put prior sanctions against Iran back in place.  This leaves the world’s 
trading partners with a conundrum of massive proportions: whether to continue 
the deal with Iran consistent with the JCPOA, risking the ire of and possible 
sanctions by the United States, or whether to pull out of the deal altogether.  
Compounding this problem, the United States has vowed to use its reinstated 
sanctions against Iran towards international businesses to force compliance with 
U.S. policy regarding trade with Iran.  This threatened display of extraterritorial 
force by the United States can possibly be sidelined by the creation and 
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enforcement of penalty schemes in support of the EU blocking statute in the 
various member countries of the EU.  However, unless the EU members really 
intend to put some teeth into their individual blocking statute penalty legislation, 
including the enactment of solid enforcement mechanisms, the EU may simply 
be bringing the proverbial sword to a gunfight.  Sooner or later, the EU will have 
to step up and exert its collective strength on the world stage or the United States 
will simultaneously exert its worldview and determine the future of international 
trading vis-à-vis Iran and most probably other countries around the world. 
